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We’re certainly going through a period that puts the “dismal” in 
the dismal science otherwise known as economics. The unem-
ployment rate has doubled over the last eighteen months as the 
economy has lost 6.5 million jobs, with more job losses expected 
in the near future. Most reasonable economic forecasts predict 
that the nation’s unemployment rate, presently at 9.6 percent, 
will reach and even exceed 10 percent before the year’s end. The 
long-term unemployment rate is now at 5.1 percent, mean-
ing that over half of the people who have lost jobs during this 
economic downturn have been without a salary for more than 
fifteen weeks. The downturn has affected not only income, but 
wealth. Household wealth has decreased by about 50 percent 
between 2004 and 2009, hitting older households hardest. 
Families headed by individuals between the ages of 55 and 64 
saw the median value of their assets decline from $315,000 in 
2004 to just $160,000 in 2009, changing the retirement plans of 
a generation of baby boomers (Rosnick and Baker 1). While our 
leaders look for green shoots and lights at the end of tunnels, we 
are left to console ourselves by finding hope in the fact that the 
rate of our descent into the economic abyss of unemployment, 
foreclosure, and bankruptcy seems to be decreasing, even as the 
descent itself continues. 
Some solace, if not genuine hope, is offered by the fact that 
we’ve been here before. The unemployment rate reached 10.8 per-
cent in November 1982 at the depths of the last big recession. But 
twelve months later, the unemployment rate had decreased by two 
percentage points, and by 1987, it had returned to its pre-recession 
level of 5.9 percent. The central message of Recession 101, a national 
billboard campaign introduced this June, is that the single most 
interesting fact about recessions is that they indeed end. 
But, to me at least, this recession seems different. Maybe it’s 
my age. In 1982, I was in the second year of my Ph.D. program. 
I had very little income as a research assistant, but I also had 
neither debts nor responsibilities to anyone but myself. Twenty-
seven years later, I am ten years from what I thought was to be 
my retirement age. I have income on which I’ve grown depen-
dent and a job that I would hate to lose. I have a house that has 
lost twenty percent of its assessed value in the last year, a child 
starting college, another one starting high school, and a retire-
ment account whose value decreases even as I continue to plough 
more into it each month. I studied the last recession; I experi-
ence this one. 
No doubt these altered circumstances explain away much of 
the difference in the public’s attitude towards this most recent 
recession. In the years since 1982, a generation of baby boomers 
like myself have matured, launched careers, and accumulated 
wealth and houses and children and parents who need extended 
and expensive care. But I don’t think that a generational life-cycle 
model alone explains the panic that has gripped the nation since 
September of 2008 when within a single month Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac collapsed; Merrill Lynch was purchased at fire-sale 
prices; Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy; the president, 
warning that “our entire economy is in danger,” asked Congress 
for $700 billion to relieve private financial institutions of their 
bad debts; and the stock market suffered the largest one-day 
decline in history. Sure, recessions happen, but this one seems 
bigger, and scarier, than any that our generation has experienced.
This panic, the one that presidents and billboards alike are 
trying to address and assuage, this heightened social sensitiv-
ity to increases in unemployment and decreases in the value of 
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stocks, is not, I believe, the result of hypersensitivity on the part 
of baby boomers to the regular peaks and troughs of a business 
cycle. The panic that accompanies this recession, which was 
largely absent from the last, results from the fact that many of us 
are genuinely and profoundly surprised at this recession’s mere 
existence. We had been told, and we sincerely believed, that this 
recession was never going to happen. In July, 2004, Washington 
Post columnist George Will proclaimed that “the economic 
problem, as understood during two centuries of industrializa-
tion, has been solved. We can reliably produce economic growth 
and have moderated business cycles.” Industry deregulation, 
globalized markets, tepid governmental regulation of commerce, 
the environment, and financial institutions, and the inscrutable 
monetary policy of Alan Greenspan had created a squeeze chute 
which effectively, we thought, corralled the economy, constrain-
ing its movements to a few harmless bucks and kicks. Our panic 
in the face of this recession is the panic the rodeo crowd experi-
ences when the bull breaks out of its squeeze chute, gores its 
handlers, and charges the stands.
And it is in this adrenalized response to the charging bull 
that I find the possibility for hope in this period of economic 
decline. Having experienced the destructive capacity of this wild 
bull market, we might be inclined to favor one of the breed’s 
more docile hybrids.
I do not mean, by choice of metaphor or example, to dispar-
age market systems in which owners of private property are free 
to exchange their goods and services. But I do hope that my 
metaphor of a charging bull highlights the danger Paul Tillich 
found embedded in the bourgeois principle that “the free flow 
of human productive forces will lead inevitably to a rational 
formation of society.” (49) Charging bulls are not rational. 
Furthermore, we neglect our obligation to our neighbors in the 
rodeo audience if we dismiss their injuries with a crude utilitari-
anism that compares the costs inflicted by the bull to the ben-
efits he generates for his owners. Markets, as most economists 
are fond of saying, are amoral, without morals. We fail in our 
moral duties when we allow these amoral institutions to have the 
final say in determining our neighbor’s welfare.
A Lutheran understanding of our role as economic agents 
needs to be grounded in the consideration of the impact of our 
actions on our neighbors. In contrast to Calvin, who largely 
supported the economic institutions of the day, Luther railed 
against a self-interested norm for market behavior. Writing on 
“Trade and Usury” in 1524, Luther observes that 
The merchants have among themselves one common rule, 
which is their chief maxim and the basis of all their sharp 
practices. They say: I may sell my goods as dear as I can. This 
they think their right. Lo, that is giving place to avarice and 
opening every door and window to hell. What does it mean? 
Only this: ‘I care nothing about my neighbor; so long as I 
have my profit and satisfy my greed, what affair is it of mine 
if it does my neighbor ten injuries at once?’…. On this basis 
trade can be nothing else than robbing and stealing other 
people’s property. (“Trade and Usury” 87)
Instead of selling dear, Luther recommends that concerns for 
the neighbor dominate market transactions, writing that, 
your selling ought not to be a work that is entirely within your 
own power and will, without law or limit, as though you were 
a god and beholden to no one; but because this selling of yours 
is a work that you perform toward your neighbor, it must be so 
governed by law and conscience, that you do it without harm 
and injury to your neighbor, and that you be much more con-
cerned to do him no injury than to make large profits. (88)
The raging bull of the market is to be constrained by consid-
erations of its impact on others.
Now, in fairness to Luther and to history, I need to point out 
that the “law and limit” Luther would impose on merchants 
does not originate with the nation state. Government interven-
tion into the marketplace was, according to Luther, “not to be 
hoped for,” as “we Germans are too busy with drinking and 
dancing to give heed to such regulation.” (89). Instead of answer-
ing to secular authorities, Luther’s merchant answers to God. 
The sale of goods is itself a work that is subject to the vocational 
call that sanctifies all human effort. As such, its practice is 
bound by concerns for neighbor.
But who is my neighbor? Should I be concerned for my fellow 
Minnesotans? My fellow Americans? My fellow human beings? 
And how do I translate my concerns for my neighbor’s welfare 
into my own market transactions in this global market place? In 
a consumer society, is consumption itself an act of vocation, and 
if so, does it matter if I buy free trade coffee or the house brand? 
And how do these questions relate to the more immediate 
question of finding hope in a period of economic decline, or the 
broader question of the vocation of the Lutheran college? 
The Lutheran understanding of market transactions as works 
that we perform toward our neighbor expands the boundar-
ies of economic analysis beyond the consideration of economic 
efficiency, forcing us to consider explicitly the personal, social, 
and distributional impacts of markets and market allocations. 
This means that we need to examine, with some suspicion, the 
analytical framework common to economics that justifies sweat 
shop labor, for example, by casting the tradeoff between prostitu-
tion and sweatshops as analogous to the choice between pizza and 
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subway sandwiches (Marglin 225). In both cases, the rational util-
ity maximizer simply chooses the option that promises to generate 
the greatest happiness; economics recognizes no moral difference 
embodied in either choice. In the words of Larry Summers (2003), 
“as long as the workers are voluntarily employed, they have chosen 
to work [in the sweatshop] because they are working to their best 
alternative.” But a Lutheran understanding of market transactions 
as works subject to a vocational call demands that we consider our 
duty to those who labor for us. Through duty to each other, the 
worker in the shoe factory and the consumer who purchases the 
pair of athletic shoes are linked in a way that is not reflected in 
the economic model of individual utility maximizers. A Lutheran 
understanding of market transactions explicitly acknowledges 
that linkage, and the responsibilities it imposes.
The Lutheran understanding of vocation as extending into all 
aspects of our work in this world, including our market trans-
actions, means that we need to be particularly mindful of the 
biases and distortions introduced into economic analysis by the 
discipline’s two traditional reference points: the highly stylized, 
rational, utility-maximizing individual and the nation-state. The 
individual who serves as the reference point for economic analysis, 
Homo economicus, is like one of those new Japanese robots in 
that, while bearing a striking resemblance to humankind, it 
seems to be missing some critical parts. Homo economicus goes 
about its days, rationally choosing between pizza and submarine 
sandwiches, eight hours of prostitution or eight hours in the 
sweatshop, calculating with amazing precision the total amount of 
“utils” generated by each activity, and, by applying the appropriate 
discount rate, is able to attain the maximum amount of happiness 
by the time its battery loses its charge. This life narrative for Homo 
economicus reduces our moral obligation to nothing other than 
assuring that it is given as much choice as possible. As only Homo 
economicus knows which choices will maximize its happiness, the 
rest of us would be wrong to force economicus to consume so many 
calories a day of protein, or so many units of education, or so many 
square feet of housing, if doing so reduces the amount of income 
economicus has to spend other goods. Our duties to each other as 
individuals are simply reduced to the avoidance of activities that 
restrict others’ choices. Furthermore, since in a market economy, 
choice is limited by income, society fulfills its obligation to its 
members by maximizing the income generated within that soci-
ety. This means that the nation-state dispenses its moral obliga-
tions by subjecting its decisions to cost-benefit analysis, which is 
itself limited to the consideration of only those costs and benefits 
accruing to the citizens of the nation state.
During the economic expansion that preceded the recent 
and precipitous market decline, critics of this sort of economic 
fundamentalism were mostly dismissed as either idealistic or 
unschooled. As nothing succeeds like success, the economic 
model credited with providing the roadmap that guided our 
ever-expanding trajectory was increasingly relied upon. To 
paraphrase from Karl Polanyi, social values in the United States 
at the beginning of the twenty-first century were corroded by “a 
crude utilitarianism combined with an uncritical reliance on the 
alleged self-healing virtues of unconscious growth” (33). Benefit-
cost analysis became the order of the day as federal regulations 
of all types were forced to prove their merits on the basis of the 
relative magnitude of their impacts on the economy. Economic 
values trumped other commitments in the areas of workplace 
safety, environmental protection, energy policy, and consumer 
product safety. The crude utilitarianism that forms the basis 
of benefit-cost analysis was used to justify everything from 
privatizing social security to refusing to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, to water-boarding. And all of this is the result of an 
allegedly moral commitment to expand the choices available to  
a humanoid known as Homo economicus.
Even as the Great Depression created the political environ-
ment that replaced laissez-faire with the New Deal, this recent 
downturn holds the possibility of encouraging another national 
conversation concerning our moral obligations to one another as 
fellow citizens, as fellow beings created in God’s image, and fellow 
souls reconciled to God through Jesus’ death and resurrection. 
It’s a conversation that I believe our Lutheran colleges are well 
suited for as intellectual heirs to both the rich understanding of 
vocation that is one of Lutheranism’s gifts to moral discourse, and 
the doctrine of the two kingdoms. Together, these two intel-
lectual traditions provide a space for a discussion of our duties to 
each other which is necessarily constrained and informed by the 
explicit recognition of our plurality and diversity.
The depth and breadth of this recent economic downturn 
has exposed some of the folly of trusting in markets and market 
valuations alone to provide for our physical needs. Government 
is also necessary. As Luther instructs in his Large Catechism, 
“although we have received from God all good things in abun-
dance, we cannot retain any of them or enjoy them in security 
and happiness unless he gives us a stable, peaceful government.” 
(430).
“.... encouraging another national  
conversation concerning our moral 
obligations to one another.”
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Our ability to retain and use God’s abundant gifts to us 
depends on government, not markets. Governments may use 
markets as tools to accomplish their purposes, but they need to 
be careful to avoid surrendering their purposes to these tools. 
The hope to be found in this recent economic decline is that we 
recognize and reclaim our role as active moral agents called to 
serve our neighbor in all of our interactions, even—or perhaps 
particularly—those taking place in the market.
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